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The objective of this study is to propose a review of the operational restrictions 
imposed on Congonhas airport by IAC 121-1013, seeking a balance between flight safety 
and operational efficiency. 
The researchers calculated the landing performance (using specific software), 
taking into account particular aircraft system failures that increase landing distance. The 
results indicated that the measures imposed by the IAC have little or no effect on the 
operational safety increase. Additionally, the restrictions created operational complexity 
for the airport and reduced its efficiency by impacting airline costs. At the end of the 
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São Paulo - Congonhas Airport is the second busiest airport in the country.  It 
represents one of the essential hubs for business and figures as the most profitable route 
in Brazilian domestic operation, being the connection between Rio de Janeiro and São 
Paulo. Its strategic location, in the center of Sao Paulo, benefits the agenda of 
businesspeople, allowing quick access from the office to air transportation. In 2018, more 
than 21 million passengers passed through Congonhas Airport.  
The airport was founded in 1936, and the city of Sao Paulo developed around the 
airport. The city growth limited the possibilities of building a better passenger terminal 
and runways. At the same time, there is no medium-term alternative to offer air transport 
for more than 21 million people attended by the airport. 
In July of 2007, Congonhas airport runway was the protagonist of the most 
significant Brazilian air crash in history, where 199 people died. An Airbus 320 from 
TAM Airlines performed a runway excursion and collided with a building nearby the 
runway threshold. 
The accident caused a huge national commotion, demanding immediate official 
actions and measures to prevent new events from taking place in the airport. At that time, 
media speculations stated that the junction of a considerably short runway with a 
potentially slippery runway condition, associated with the heavy-aircraft operation, was 
incompatible and significantly dangerous.  
Together with these assumptions, the aircraft involved in the accident was 
dispatched with one Engine Thrust Reverser inoperative (which is a routine operational 
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condition). But under the public sight, the lack of an engine reverse sounded like one of 
the first accident causes. Consequently, the intense public pressure over the government 




Congonhas airport operational limitations were implemented before the 
conclusion of the official investigation.  
In other words, the operational limitations measures were imposed to give a quick 
answer to the public outcry increasing the airport operational safety margin. 
More than ten years after the accident,  the researchers’ focus is understanding if 
the limitations imposed on the airport operation indeed represent an increase in safety 
margin avoiding a new event. Or, if the constraints are oversized, raising costs solely, 
without a definite increase in safety. At the same time, the researchers will highlight the 
impact on the airport operation. 
These restrictions were issued during the investigations and implemented through 
the Civil Aviation Instruction IAC 121-1013, published on April 1st, 2008, impacting the 
heavy-jets operation and, as a result, the airlines.  
Below are the IAC 121-1013 main restrictions: 
• Minimum Equipment List  
• Limitation of Extra Fuel load 
• Wet runway landing obligations: 
• Prohibition of takeoff and landing  
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Project Goals and Scope 
 
Until now, the same restrictive measures remain in effect. The central 
objective of this study case is to deep-dive into Congonhas IAC121-1013 
measures, analyzing its technical background and safety effectiveness. At the 
same time, the researchers will evaluate which measure the Advisory Circular hits 
the spot, increasing safety, and which is only detrimental to the efficiency of air 
transportation.  
As CGH is one of the most critical HUBs in the country, any limitation to 
its capacity represents a significant impact on airlines and users. In the limit, 
lower capacity means higher fares.  
Since the event of the accident, several technologies have been 
implemented by the aircraft manufacturers, which allow the pilot to evaluate in a 
more precise way the impact of any failure in the landing distance performance. 
This study will expand the analysis of the measures applied to the 
Congonhas Airport through the IAC121-1013, highlighting the actual causes of 
the accident based on the official conclusive investigation.  
One of the new technologies the researchers will explore during our study 
is the use of Electronic Flight Bag (EFB). 
The implementation of the landing performance assessment through EFB 
allows pilots to have a realistic scenario and precise calculation of the landing 
condition, even in the case of failures or items deferred by the aircraft Minimum 
Equipment List (MEL).   
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The result of this study will be presented to the aeronautical authority. The 
researchers will request to revisit the restrictions imposed by the IAC 121-1013 
and propose new measures foreseeing to make aircraft operation in CGH more 
efficient as well safe.                 
                                               . 
Definitions of Terms  
 
Actual Landing Distance is the distance used in landing and braking to a complete 
stop (on dry runway) after crossing the runway threshold at 
50 feet. 
Electronic Flight Bag is an electronic device that helps flight crews perform flight 
management tasks more quickly and efficiently, providing 
precise calculations and information. 
Extra fuel   Additional fuel supplied above the minimum required by  
    legislation 
Landing distance  Actual landing distance is the distance used in landing and 
braking to a complete stop (on a dry runway) after crossing 
the runway threshold at 50 feet. 
Minimum Equipment List is a list that provides for the operation of aircraft, 
subject to specified conditions, with particular 
equipment inoperative (which is) prepared by an 
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operator in conformity with, or more restrictive 
than, the MEL established for the aircraft type. 
Required Landing Distance is the distance obtained through the application of a 
factor to the actual landing distance.  
Runway Excursion  A veer-off or overrun off the runway surface. 
 
List of Acronyms   
AC   Advisory Circular 
AFM   Aircraft Flight Manual 
ALD   Actual Landing distance 
ANAC   Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil 
ARC   Abnormal Runway Contact 
CENIPA Aeronautical Accident Investigations and Prevention 
Center  
CFIT   Controlled Flight IntoTerrain 
CGH            IATA code for Congonhas airport 
EFB   Electronic Flight Bag 
FCOM  Flight Crew Operating Manual 
IAC   Civil Aviation Instruction 
LOC-I   Loss of Control in Flight 
MEL   Minimum Equipment List 
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TALPA ARC Takeoff and Landing Performance Assessment Aviation 
Rulemaking Group 
RE  Runway Excursions 
 RESA   Runway End Safety Area 
RBAC  Regulamento Brasileiro de Aviação Civil 
RLD  Required Landing Distance 
SCF   System/Component Failure 
SOP Standard Operating Procedure 
 
Plan of study 
 
The researchers will evaluate the restrictions currently applied at Congonhas 
airport after the 2007 accident. This analysis will include four parts: an introduction; an 
in-depth review of all the regulations regarding the landing safety, the basic regulation 
like RBAC 121, and an analysis of the restrictions applied in CGH. 
In part three, the researchers will review all the restrictions applied through the 
IAC 121-1013 in Congonhas airport, analyzing the effectiveness of the landing safety.  
Finally, in part four, the researchers will present a proposal for the IAC 121-1013 








Review of the Relevant Literature 
 
Introduction 
To understand all the motivations behind the CGH IAC 121-1013 as well as the 
characteristics of Congonhas Airport at the time the restrictions were published, the 
researchers will present relevant regulation and documentation that in this chapter.    
Two pillars are considered fundamental by the researchers to perform air 
transportation. The first pillar is the safe conduction of operation, and the second is the 
economic viability of the operation and its efficiency.  
Therefore, the researchers are committed to understanding to which extent the 
operation limits imposed to Congonhas Airport operation indeed became safety 




In 1996, eleven years before the 2007 accident, Congonhas Airport was the scene 
of a Fokker 100 crash, killing more than 100 people a few minutes after takeoff.  
The cause of the accident was a failure in the aircraft's reverser system that was 
spuriously deployed, not allowing the plane from flying after takeoff. 
Due to the repercussion of this accident and other minor crashes, the airport is 




At the beginning of 2007, the pavement of the runway at Congonhas airport was 
restored. The purpose of the work was to eliminate the surface irregularities and prevent 
water accumulation, which was both considered a chronic runaway problem.  
The process of restoring the runway pavement was done in steps. After the 
pavement restore process was ready, more time was needed until the runway could be 
grooved (cuts in the runway surface transversely to the pavement centerline).  
The airport authority decides to authorize the runway operation with the grooving 
pavement service not ready to avoid operational disruptions.  
 
Aeronautical Accidents Categories 
 
To better understand and separate similar events, the accidents are classified. 
Aviation organizations worldwide define more than 40 different accident categories. 
According to the study, A Statistical Analysis of Commercial Aviation Accidents 1958-
2018 (AIRBUS, 2019), the five more significant accident categories are: 
 
• Runway Excursion (RE): a lateral veer off or longitudinal overrun off the 
surface, not caused by any system failure or malfunction or abnormal runway 
contact. Therefore, the TAM accident is classified as a RE. 
• System/Component Failure or Malfunction (SCF): Failure or malfunction of 
an aircraft system or component, related to either its design, the manufacturing 
process, or a maintenance issue, which leads to an accident. SCF includes the 
powerplant, software, and database systems. 
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• Loss of Control in Flight (LOC-I): Loss of aircraft control while in flight, not 
primarily due to SCF. 
• Abnormal Runway Contact (ARC): Hard or unusual landing, not primarily due 
to SCF, leading to an accident. 
• Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT): In-flight collision with terrain, water, or 
obstacle without indication of loss of control. 
 
According to the Airbus study, Runway Excursions (RE), including both lateral 
and longitudinal types, are the third more important cause of fatal accidents by numbers, 
and the single most significant cause 15% of hull losses. (AIRBUS, 2019) 
In Figure 2.1 below, the researchers can see how significant the contribution of 
runway excursions to total accidents is, where more than 35% result in aircraft losses. 
 
 Figure 2.1 - Percentage of hull losses by accident category 1999-2018 
Runway Excursions are very related to the subject of takeoff and landing 
performance assessment, the researchers recognize the importance of this data, with 
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significant industry efforts to reduce these numbers. The researchers consider any 
reduction in the operating safety margins to be non-negotiable.  
One of the last efforts to avoid RE was the development of a new methodology 
for conveying current runway conditions. This methodology is based on 
recommendations from the Takeoff and Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) 
Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC). These recommendations are currently being 
adopted in Brazil, and it has already been implemented in takeoff and landing 
performance assessment throughout the Electronic Flight Bag (EFB). 
 
JJ3054 2007 Air Crash in Congonhas Airport 
 
On 17 July 2007, the flight JJ3054, an Airbus model 320 (registration PR-MBK), 
departed from Porto Alegre (POA) to Congonhas Airport (CGH) with 181 souls on 
board. The flight can be considered as routine up to the landing. 
One central issue was that the plane was dispatched with Engine two reverser 
pinned (de-activated), by MEL.  
Before JJ3054 landing, according to CENIPA’s Final Report, Congonhas Tower 
informed that the active landing runway (RWY35L) was wet and slippery. As stated in 
the background section, to avoid disruptions in air operations, the airport authority 
decided to authorize the runway operation without the grooving pavement.  
During the landing run of JJ3054, the aircraft didn't slow down as expected, 
leading to a runway excursion, overrunning the left edge of the runway near the departure 
end. The plane crossed over the Washington Luís Avenue and collided with a building 
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and with a gas station. All souls on board plus 12 people on ground perished 
(CENIPA,2009, pg.71). 
According to CENIPA, the inoperative Engine Reverse played a central role in 
the accident. Table 2.1 below shows several occurrences related to mistaken thrust levers 
setting. The pinned reverser landing procedure is directed related to these incidents, 
which are not limited to Airbus aircraft: 
Table 2.1 - Accidents related to a mistaken thrust lever setting (CENIPA, 2009, pg. 58) 
 
Among the accidents listed in table 2.1, two occurred in similar conditions as the 
flight JJ3054: Philippines and Taiwan. In both cases, one reverser was deactivated 
(pinned). And pilots kept one thrust lever in CL position, bringing only one thrust lever to 
IDLE, preventing the aircraft from decelerating. 
Due to these events, Airbus changed the A-320F MEL pinned reverser landing 
procedure regarding the thrust levers setting after touchdown.  
Aiming to make the pilot job simpler, Airbus made the procedure the same as the 
standard landing procedure with both reversers available. So, at the time of the TAM 
DATE AIRCRAFT LOCATION 
08/Apr/1983 B747 Karachi – Pakistan 
30/Mar/1985 A300 Perpignan – France 
06/Apr/1987 B747-300 Rio de Janeiro – Brazil 
12/Sept/1998 DC-10 Denver - USA 
22/Mar/1998 A320 Bacolod – Philippines 
28/Aug/2002 A320 Phoenix – USA 
18/Oct/2004 A320 Taipei – Taiwan 
05/Nov/2005 B747 Paris – France 
19/Dec/2003 B737 Libreville - Gabon 
14/Dec/2005 B747 McGuire AFB – USA 
12/Jun/2006 A310 Irkutsk - Russia 
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accident, the landing with one inoperative reverser MEL procedure required that after 
touchdown, both thrust levers moved to "REV," instead of only one lever. 
When the Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) was decoded, investigators 
concluded that “the FDR did not record any thrust lever movement of the number 2 
engine (the one with the pinned reverser), from the moment it was positioned at “CL”, up 
to the collision of the aircraft”(CENIPA, 2009,pg.74). 
With one thrust lever in CL position and the other in IDLE, JJ3054 aircraft had 
one engine still producing forward thrust, and one engine reversing. Consequently, the 
spoilers and auto brake also didn’t activate. The aircraft kept high speed consuming the 
total length of the runway, with energy high enough to veer off and crash into the 
buildings on the other side of the avenue. 
The CENIPA Final report issued several recommendations to the Congonhas 
airport operators. One of the restrictions was the prohibition of operation when the 
aircraft presents one reverser inoperative. According to CENIPA Final Report: 
“Despite the fact that the reverser is a complementary decelerating system not considered 
for the calculation of the landing distance (dry runway), it is a component whose 
contribution to the braking of the aircraft is significant. Especially when operating on the 
runway with reduced dimensions and with a problematic historical background, as was 
the case of the Congonhas runway” (CENIPA Final Report, pg. 81).  
According to CENIPA Final Report, the inoperability of one engine reverser 
could have somehow influenced the pilot, from a psychological perspective, although the 




Congonhas Civil Aviation Instruction - IAC 121-1013 
 
One of the ANAC regulatory publications is the Civil Aviation Instruction (IAC). 
The IACs aims to establish procedures or clarify rules or requirements contained in the 
RBAC related to civil aviation (IAC 001-1001A, pg 4). The Brazilian IAC is similar to 
the FAA Advisory Circular  
In April 01st of 2008, ANAC issued the Congonhas Civil Aviation Instruction 
(IAC 121-1013). The purpose of this IAC was to establish additional technical-
operational procedures and requirements necessary to authorize the safe operation of 
large reaction transport aircraft at Congonhas Airport (São Paulo). 
The Congonhas IAC 121-1013 represents a compilation of operational safety 
recommendations emitted by CENIPA during the accident investigation.  
The following IAC 121-1013 restrictions impact on Airline operations: 
• Landing operation in the case of any MEL dispatch with inoperative systems that 
compromise landing performance, such as command surfaces, brakes, reversers, 
etc.  
• Landing operation in the case of In-Flight failures where “inoperative instruments 
or equipment that compromise the aircraft landing performance, such as 
command surfaces (ailerons, flaps, slats, spoilers), brakes, reversers, etc.).”  
• Wet runway limitation 
• Landing with tailwind 
• Five knots reduction on the FCOM maximum crosswind landing value  
•  Takeoff with reduced thrust (Derated or Flex) 
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• The auxiliary runway operation when transporting passengers is prohibited 
• Dispatch limited to 3 tons of EXTRA FUEL. 
  It is essential to notice that the operational limitation imposed on Congonhas do 
not touch thrust levers mishandling. The practical result of the industry is a more 
complex operational scenario for pilots and airlines.  
After applying the IAC 121-1013 in routine operation, it became evident that 
flights are more prone to diversions and cancelations. Once the IAC directives are 
restricting landings that would be allowable in other similar airports. 
For example, suppose that during a regular flight to CGH, the pilot faces a failure 
in Landing Gear Control and Interface Unit (LGCIU). This failure affects the reverse 
operation. In terms of performance, there are no landing increments or penalties, but, due 
to the IAC 121-1013, the flight is forbidden to land in CGH, being forced to divert to 
another airport. 
Congonhas is the second most crucial HUB in Brazil. If even routine minor 
failures can avoid aircraft from landing in CGH, it is also true that the Maintenance 
Centers located in Congonhas will be affected. If, in most cases, the aircraft is obliged to 
divert (to Campinas VCP, for example). The airline has to deal with a double operational 
disruption: fix the aircraft out of the main Base and also accommodate the passengers of 
the diverted flight. 
On a lower scale, we have the tailwind together with a wet runway prohibition. 
This limitation follows the same path of all IAC121-1013 restrictions, which does not 
authorize the landing even if the assessed aircraft performance permits.  
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A Review of Approach and Landing Regulations 
 
As seen on the IAC 121-1013 section, the Congonhas IAC imposed limits (or 
prohibition) to the landing operation depending on the aircraft conditions.  
Before making any suggestion to the IAC 121-1013, in the first place, it is 
essential to fully understand the official regulation fundaments behind the Landing 
Distance assessment. 
As previously mentioned, the Runway Excursions (RE), is the third most 
important cause of fatal accidents, and the single most significant cause of hull (fuselage) 
losses (AIRBUS, 2019). Therefore, it is crucial to mention all the regulations behind the 
landing distance calculation as well as the measures taken by the industry to reduce 




The Approach-and-landing Accident Reduction (ALAR) issued by the Flight 
Safety Foundation (FSF), defines the Actual Landing Distance (ALD) as the distance 
used in landing and braking to a complete stop (on a dry runway) after crossing the 
runway threshold at 50 feet. It represents the landing distance published on the Aircraft 
Flight Manual (AFM) by manufacturers and is also the origin of all other landing distance 
calculation (Flight Safety Foundation, 2009) 
The Required Landing Distance (RDL) is the distance obtained by the application 





In Brazil, the flight dispatch process is regulated by the RBAC 121. This 
regulation is mostly a transcript of the FAR 121, following aviation standard best 
practices. 
The researchers focused on RBAC 121 to highlight the regulation regarding 
landing performance calculation.  RBAC requires that the destination landing distance is 
calculated before takeoff, during the dispatch process. 
According to RBAC 121.195, it is not allowed to take off a turbine engine 
airplane in such a way that upon arrival, it exceeds the AFM landing weight. In other 
words, the RBAC 121.195 prevents an aircraft from being dispatched above the 
maximum landing weight for a given location. Additionally, the RLD should consider the 
weather forecast for the landing time and apply dry and wet runway safety factors. 
Additionally, the RBAC 121.195 says that the aircraft shall land at the destination 
aerodrome using 60% of the runway length (1.67 factor) and passes 50 feet above the 
runway threshold (RBAC 121.195, p.45).  
Besides, the RBAC 121.195 also states that when the weather forecast indicates 
that the destination aerodrome runway may be wet or slippery at the estimated landing 
time, no Dispatch will be allowed unless the runway length is at least 115% (1.92 factor) 
of the actual landing distance for the specific conditions (RBAC 121.195, p.42).  
In figure 2.2 below, the researchers can see the requirements and factors that must 




Figure. 2.2 Landing distance dispatch requirements 
In simple words, any aircraft must be dispatched to an airport without a landing 
analysis saying that the actual landing distance multiplied by the factor of 1.67 (dry) or 
1.92 (when forecast wet) is following runway length from the destination airport.                                                                         
The factor mentioned above intends to determine a safe operational runway length 
and provide a realistic level of performance accounting normal operational variability in 
day to day service (FAA 121.195): 
• Runway surface conditions; 
• Piloting techniques; 
• Tire and brake deterioration; 
• Atmospheric instability such as gusts of wind shear; 
• Crosswinds; 
• Approach to touchdown; and 
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• Flightpath deviations. 
 
Runway End Safety Area (RESA) 
 
 Several safety recommendations came during the JJ3054 accident investigation, 
which meant to bring additional safety margins to the Congonhas Airport operation. 
On 17th Sept of 2007, CENIPA issued a central recommendation determining the 
establishment of the Runway End Safety Area (RESA) in Congonhas Airport (CENIPA 
Final Report, page 103). The proposal is based on the ICAO Annex 14, which establishes 
high priority to the RESA implementation.  
Runway End Safety Area (RESA) can be defined as a symmetrical area along 
with the runway axis extension, primarily used to reduce the risk of damage to aircraft 
during takeoff and landing in the event of overshoot, undershoot or excursion (RBAC 
154, 2019). 
 Houses and buildings surround Congonhas Airport; therefore, there was no room 
to extend the runway to implement the RESA. Consequently, the runway was virtually 






Figure 2.3 Runway End Safety Area (RESA) 
 
In-Flight Landing Distances 
 
After departure, landing distances verified at the flight dispatch process are 
disregarded. Once airborne, pilots are required to compute the in-flight landing distance, 
instead of the flight dispatch landing calculations.  
The in-flight landing distance assessment takes into account the current aircraft 
status, actual runway conditions, and possible performance degradation generated by 
failures during the flight that may affect the landing distance.  
The way these in-flight landing distance assessments are performed has 
significantly changed over the past decade. 
Inflight landing distance (IFLD) calculations used to be solely performed thought 
paper tables available in the cockpit.  Such tables required calculations and interpolation 
methods. Due to the nature of the activity, and considering the cockpit environment, pilot 
workload, among others, this process could lead to imprecise results. Furthermore, 




Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) 
 
The Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) is an electronic management device (portable or 
installed) that allows pilots to perform the necessary calculations more quickly and 
efficiently with less paper. It is a computing platform aiming to reduce, or substitute, 
paper-based material such as performance tables, documentation such as aircraft 
operating manual, navigational charts (offering moving map for air and ground 
operations), performance application software designed to automate tasks typically 
conducted by hand, such as performance take-off and landing calculations (FAA AC 120-
76D, 2017). Figure 2.3 is an example of portable and installed EFBs. 
 
 
Figure 2.4 – Installed and portable EFB examples 
 
The EFB has several benefits over conventional methods: 
• Reduces, in some cases, eliminates paper in the cockpit, reducing the 
flight crew workload. 




• Dedicated software can perform the necessary calculations, which were 
previously completed by hand. It reduces paperwork and reduces the space 
for human error. 
• Accurate takeoff and landing performance calculation. Thus enhancing 
fuel consumption and aircraft engine life. 
• Improved safety and flight efficiency throughout precise onboard 
calculations, and thus eliminating work previously completed by hand. 
• It makes it possible to exchange information, enabling the flight crew to 
access the latest data. 
• Real-time weather information. 
• Flight reports can be rapidly sent.  
• Electronic document storage getting pilots and cockpit rid of hard copies, 
which are naturally difficult to keep updated. 
 
As stated above, one of the central advantages of the EFB over previous 
methods is performance applications, which makes the calculations faster and more 
accurate, reducing human errors.  








Airbus Electronic Flight Bag Performance and Manual Application (FlySmart Plus) 
 
 
Flysmart+ Ops Lib 
Flysmart + Ops Library is an application designed to enable access to all Airbus 
operational manuals (FCOM, MEL, FCTM, AFM) and in-house manuals. Airbus Ops 
Library Browser offers an easy way to navigate through all Airbus manuals (thanks to 
hyperlinks) fully integrated and linked to Flysmart+ Takeoff and Flysmart+ Landing 
applications. 
 
Flysmart + TakeOff 
Flysmart + TakeOff permits compute Airbus aircraft takeoff performance. The 
optimization process provides optimum Takeoff weight or Flexible temperature based on 
the actual weather conditions and actual aircraft configuration (considering selected 
differed MEL and CDL items, if any). Flysmart + TakeOff features enhance graphics 




Flysmart + Landing compute aircraft landing performance (dispatch or in-flight 
assessment). The optimization process provides optimum results based on the actual 
weather conditions and actual aircraft configuration (considering selected differed MEL 




Flysmart + Landing features enhanced graphics on runway information, which 
drastically increases situational awareness. 
 
EFB Calculations and Actual Landing Distance Calculation Comparison 
Differently, from the dispatch landing distance assessment, the EFB In-Flight 
Landing Distance considers a comprehensive analysis to determine the landing distance 
performance. While the previous Actual Landing Distances paper methods are 
determined considering:  
• Flying an optimum flight segment from 50 feet over the runway threshold 
to the flare. 
• Firmly touchdown (not extending the flare). 
• Use maximum pedal braking 
According to the Flight Safety Foundation, these published landing distances are 
seldom achieved in line operations (ALAR, 2000).  
 




Figure 2.6 shows an example of an actual landing distance paper table, with all the hand 
corrections that must be accomplished by the pilots.  
 
 
Figure 2.6 - Actual Landing Distance 
 
EFB Landing Calculation 
As shown in figure 2.6, the calculations performed by the EFB consider a 7 
seconds flare in the In-Flight Landing Distance. This extended flare time adds a 
protection layer. As it is closer to the pilot line operation real scenario, instead of flying 
directly onto the ground aiming a firm touchdown. 
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Figure 2.7 – Flare time used in EFB calculations 
 Aiming to present the EFB potentialities as well as the information provided, you 
can follow below figure 2.7 and figure 2.8, showing an Airbus 320-214 landing dispatch 
and in-flight landing performance calculation on both Congonhas runways.  
17R DISPATCH - DRY 35L DISPATCH - DRY 
  
Figure 2.8 – RWY 17R and 35L RLD at Dispatch 
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The researchers can observe that there are no limitations on Runway 17R/35L for 
dry conditions, allowing the landing at the maximum landing weight (MLW) 64.5 tons.  
It is essential to understand that in case of a wet runway forecast, the flight would 
be automatically dispatched with the 1.92 factor, instead of 1.67.  
According to TALPA ARC, during the in-flight landing distance assessment, 
pilots should apply a safety margin of at least 15 percent (factored landing distance) when 
based on manual wheel braking.  
 One of the configurations options that determine safety margins is the selection of 
auto brake. If the manual braking distance provides a 15 percent safety margin, then the 
braking technique may include a combination of auto brakes and manual braking. Even if 
the selected auto brake landing data does not provide a 15 percent safety margin. 
 For study purposes, all calculations will consider manual braking selection. This 
selection is the most conservative configuration and is the threshold of the utilization of 












17R IN FLIGHT - DRY 35L IN FLIGHT - DRY 
  
Figure 2.9 – RWY 17R and 35L In-Flight landing distance  
In Figure 2.9, despite the thrust reverse being taking into account only for wet 
runway landing distance calculations, the reverses were applied in both scenarios. 
As stated earlier, the SBSP runway has been virtually reduced to include a 280-
meter RESA.  
In table 2.3 below, the researchers can observe all the values presented in figures 







17R 64.5/1645/15 64.5/1164/1339/321 
35L 64.5/1645/15 64.5/1173/1349/311 
 






This chapter describes the methodology used by the researchers to understand the 
impacts caused by IAC 121-1013 applied in Congonhas Airport, comparing to the desired 
increment of safety margin intended by the IAC. Researchers applied all restrictions 
imposed by IAC121-1013 to quantify their practical impact on IFLD operating margins. 
 
Theory of Constraints 
To improve operating efficiency and maintain flight safety excellence, the 
researchers applied a method to find the most significant constrains, their opportunities 
for improvement, and the impacts of their implementation on efficiency and safety. 
A theory choose to guide researchers in the Theory of Constraints (TOC). TOC is 
widely used to improve the efficiency of business operations. Developed by Eliyahu 




Figure 3.1 – Theory of Constrains 
Identify the constraints 
In our study case, the restrictions imposed on the Congonhas Airport operation 
will be treated as the constraints. The list of restrictions considered are: 
• Minimum Equipment List items that affect the landing distance 
• Limitation of Extra Fuel load 
• Wet runway landing obligations 
• Prohibition of takeoff and landing from the auxiliary runway 
Exploit the constraints 
This is one of the most critical phases in our process, as reviewing safety 
recommendations applied to an accident requires precise criteria. Through an analysis of 
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the purpose of constraints and their effectiveness, the researchers consider that one 
enforced restriction must be maintained so that all others can be reevaluated.  
The application of RESA on the 17R / 35L runway in Congonhas airport 
increased the safety margins and allowed us to evaluate the removal of the remaining 
restrictions. Using the EFB tool, the researchers can accurately verify how far such limits 
could be modified. 
Subordinate the constrains 
In this step, researchers must evaluate all the processes necessary to remove the 
process safely. Questions such as: Do we have the tools needed to remove it? Do pilots 
and operators have the training to operate them and act in case of contingencies? Does 
the removal of restrictions comply with regulations? 
Subjecting initiatives to validation is critical to maintaining safety margins and 
collaborating with the final step to assess the consequences and effectiveness of actions. 
Elevate the constraint 
This process seeks to increase capacity by raising the constrains. In an air 
operation, there will always be restrictions or risk-mitigating measures. The goal is to 






Repeat is the last step that leads us to make a final assessment of the measures. 
This step puts us in the process of continuous improvement because by solving a 
problem; we can create other needs. In our study case, we focused mainly on maintaining 
safety margins and identifying possible impacts that the removal of restrictions may have 
on operations. 
Congonhas IAC 121-1013 MEL Restrictions 
 
As previously stated, Congonhas IAC doesn’t allow aircraft operating with MEL 
differed items in which system and equipment inoperability could compromise braking 
aircraft performance (increasing Landing distance). It is essential to highlight that this 
prohibition applies even if the calculated actual landing performance fits the runway 
length.  
For this study case, the researchers will use the same tools available in the cockpit 
to analyze and understand the impact of differed MEL items in landing distance 
calculations and, consequently, in the safety margins. The EFB will be set up with the 
corresponding landing data for all failures: 
Weather settings 
WIND º / kt:   000/0 
OAT ºC:   15 (ISA + 5) 
QNH hPa:   1013 





Landing Weight:  64.5 or the highest possible 
Landing CG:   Basic 
Flap Configuration:  FULL 
Air Cond.:   ON 
Anti-Ice:   Off 
Approach Type:  Normal 
Go Around Gradient:  2.5% 
MAN LDG A-THR:  ON 
Brake Mode:   MANUAL 
Reverser Use:   Yes 
 
After presenting the calculations, a table will compare the safety margins without 
failures, with the margins of dispatched MEL items, which operation is forbidden in 
Congonhas.  
Additionally, the researchers will make a comparison of the RLD assessment 
done during the flight dispatch with the IFLD. The target of this comparison is to 
highlight that the requirement of applying the factors of 1.67 / 1.92 in dispatch, 






One Thrust Reverse Inoperative – MEL 78-30-01A 
RWY 17R DRY RWY 35L DRY 
  















Table 3.1 – Impact of MEL 78-30-01on IFLD 
 




In-flight Landing Distance 
LW LD/FLD Margin 
17R 
No Failure 64.5 1164/1339 321 
17R 
78-30-01 
One Thrust reverser 
64.5 1205/1386 274 
35L 
No Failure 64.5 1173/1349 311 
35L 
78-30-01 
One Thrust reverser 
64.5 1215/1397 263 
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Braking/Steering Control Unit (BSCU) System 1 – MEL 32-42-03A 
RWY 17R DRY RWY 35L DRY 
  















In-flight Landing Distance 
LW LD/FLD Margin 
17R 




64.5 1399 321 
35L 




64.5 1349 311 
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In the failure presented in table 3.2, the Brake and Steering Control Unit 1 (BSCU 
1) is backed-up by the BSCU 2. Even though the IAC121-1013 forbids the operation 
when one BSCU is inoperative,  there is no impact on landing distance.  
 
Landing Gear Control and Interface Unit (LGCIU) 1 in-flight – MEL 32-31-01 
RWY 17R DRY RWY 35L DRY 
  
 

















Table 3.3 – Impact of MEL 32-31-01 on IFLD 
 
  The LGCIU 1 failure shown in table 3.3, is a no-dispatch condition; this means 
that the aircraft will not take off when this failure is present. However, in case it occurs 
during the flight, the EFB can calculate the landing distances.  
The EFB offers calculations taking account systems failures that could impact the 
landing performance, being precise even with multiple failures. The landing performance 
calculation outputs take less than 30 seconds to be electronically presented for pilots. 
  Taking a closer look at the landing distance numbers for LGCIU 1 failure, the 
researchers observe that the impacts are not significant. Once again, even though the 
calculation assures that the operation even with the LGCIU 1 is possible, the IAC 121-






In-flight Landing Distance 
LW LD/FLD Margin 
17R 




64.5 1184/1361 299 
35L 








Spoiler Elevator Computer (SEC) 1 – MEL 27-94-01A 
RWY 17R DRY RWY 35L DRY 
  














In-flight Landing Distance 
LW LD/FLD Margin 
17R 




64.5 1236/1422 238 
35L 




64.5 1246/1333 277 
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  The Spoiler and Elevator Computer 1 failure have a minimum impact on landing 
distance.  Even though the landing with SEC 1 failure is possible according to the EFB 
calculation, the IAC121-1013 doesn’t allow such operation, as long as the operation 
without spoiler is forbidden.   
  
Limitation of Extra Fuel load 
  
  The extra fuel is all the additional fuel supply to a flight above the minimum fuel 
required, respecting the regulations. The CGH IAC121-1013 forbids airlines from 
supplying their aircraft with more than 3 tons of extra fuel.  
The IAC objective is to limit the aircraft landing weight.  
But the IAC doesn’t establish an Alternate airport distance. So, in case the flight 
is planned with a distant alternate airport, there will be less extra fuel “hidden” in the 
alternate airport route.  
In other words, the alternate airport could be used to manipulate the extra fuel. 
And instead of choosing a 1-hour distant alternate airport, the flight dispatcher can select 
a 2-hour distant airport, and the minimum fuel required will be increased. The aircraft 
will be landing with a higher landing weight despite the limitation of extra fuel. 
     The industry has a practice of transporting extra fuel loaded in airports where 
the price is lower. This practice makes it worthy to carry the extra fuel to an airport where 





Wet Runway Landing Obligations 
 
 Tailwind is a significative landing distance factor. In other words, the higher the 
tailwind, the longer will be the landing distance (Flight Safety Foundation ALAR, 2000) 
On the other hand, landing with a headwind is desired, as long as the headwind reduces 
the landing distance. 
 So, figure 3.5 compares two different wet runways landing scenarios:  3 knots 
headwind (HW3), with 3 knots tailwind (TW3). Obviously, for the same aircraft weight, 
the tailwind will produce more landing distance. But, as previously mentioned,  the 
research methodology consists of analyzing the landing performance under the IAC121-
1013 restrictions and compare with performance assessment. 
In figure 3.5, the first analysis considered 63.7 tons of Landing Weight, and for 
the second scenario, consider a lighter weight of 59 tons of Landing Weight.  
The landing distance calculated for both conditions is exactly (the same, A landing with a 
headwind could have less margin at a specific landing weight that a landing in a 
lightweight with a tailwind. 
So, this restriction does not improve safety margins and is focusing on the wrong 
parameter. 
As an example, let us make a comparison of two flights with the same landing 






RWY 17R WET 63.7T HW3 RWY 17R WET 59T TW3 
  







Table 3.5– Same margins with different wind direction 
  
 
In figure 15, it is evident that a restriction of the tailwind operation does not increase the 
safety of the operation. It all depends on the landing weight of the aircraft. Of course, this 
restriction could limit the MLW with a tailwind, but in fact, if the only reason to limit 





In-flight Landing Distance 
LW LD/FLD Margin 
17R 
HeadWind 3 KTS 63.7 1434/1649 11 
35L 
TailWind 3 KTS 59.0 1434/1649 11 
 
 49 
Prohibition of Flex Takeoff and Reduced Takeoff when the Runway is Wet 
  
The use of the maximum thrust of an engine generates high costs and reduces the 
engine life, so it is desirable to takeoff with reduced thrust setting whenever applicable  
(Airbus FCOM, 2018).  
 
RWY 17R WET 60T FLEX TO RWY 17R WET 60T TOGA 
  
Figure 3.7 – Flex and TOGA setting with the same Takeoff weight 
In Figure 3.7, the researchers can see that even on takeoffs with smaller power 
thrust setting, the safety margin is achieved. The limiting factor will always be the MLW 




Prohibition of Takeoff and Landing from the Auxiliary Runway (when transporting 
passengers).  
Neither the IAC121-1013 nor the Accident Final Report gives any explanation for 
the prohibition of the Congonhas Airport's secondary runway operation for aircraft 




This study aims to deeply analyze the IAC 121-1013 that restricts operation in the 
Congonhas Airport. The IAC came as a response from the TAM airlines flight JJ3054 
accident, which official investigation concluded that a pilot mishandling of the thrust 
levers led to a runway excursion, killing 188 people on board.  
The Final Investigation Report made several recommendations, such as training, 
aircraft engineering changes, runway infrastructure enhancements, and operational 
restrictions to Congonhas.  
As a consequence, the IAC 121-1013 limited the operation in Congonhas with 
any failure that could affect the landing distance performance. Under a first sight, it may 
sound sensate. But, taking a closer look, these restrictions, create operational challenges 
for pilots and airlines, with unclear increment in safety.  
Minor failures (inflight or deferred by MEL) represents a normal operational 
condition, being part of the routine of any airline. Therefore, limiting the operation in 
CGH in such situations creates some additional challenges for pilots and maintenance 
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management.  Instead of executing the landing distance assessment considering the 
failure (pair of spoilers, for example), the pilot is forced to divert, increasing costs, with 
unclear gain in safety. 
The landing distance assessment performed nowadays is a robust process 
accomplished through the pilot EFBs (Electronic Flight Bag). This is a lot more accurate 
and comprehensive method than previous paper tables, the only option available at the 
time of the accident.  
Together with a more precise landing distance calculation, came the ICAO RESA 
(International Civil Aviation Organization Runway Extended Safety Area), that virtually 
reduced the Congonhas runway in 280 meters. Consequently reducing the aircraft weight 
and providing extra area for contingencies.  
Putting all together, researchers intend to prove that most of IAC 121-1013 















It has been twelve years since the accident. After all this time, the measures 
imposed to Congonhas airport has not been revisited by authorities, even though after 
new safety improvements (EFB and RESA) were implemented.  The researchers are 
proposing a review of the restrictive measures applied to Congonhas airport through an 
analysis of the actual effectiveness and impact of the measures. 
Some of the restrictions imposed are effective and must be maintained so that 
safety margins can prevent a new runway excursion. 
The airport-imposed restrictions may have made some sense just after the 
accident, as long as the claim for an immediate response was too heavy. Authorities 
should be given some answers to society after the deaths of 199 people.  
On the other hand, after twelve years of passed, it is relevant to reanalyze the 
measures under a new sight.  
Under the researcher’s sight, there is one measure that was the most effective 
decision at that time: the implementation of RESA. This measure brought a virtual (but 
effective) scape area and increasing the safety margin.  The RESA implementation allows 
a takeoff and landing performance assessment with a component that brought a 
measurable impact, mainly in the event of unexpected contingencies. 
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Even though the implementation of the RESA may have brought payload 
operational limitations, financially impacting the airlines, the decision was in line with 
ICAO recommendation, bringing additional safety margin to operation. 
All margins presented in this study have an additional 280 meters margin due to 
the virtual reduction of the Congonhas runway, the RESA. So, in any case, every 
presented landing margin has an extra 280m RESA. For instance, if we have an EFB 
calculated margin of 300; in fact, there is a real 580 meters margin. Pilots and flight 
dispatchers could not consider this margin during landing assessment. But it will be used 
in case of emergency and will not be considered a runway excursion. 
In the next sessions, the researchers will present the conclusions about each restriction 
imposed. 
MEL and IN-FLIGHT failures 
 Since the beginning of the study, researchers evaluate the effectiveness of the 
restrictions applied to the Congonhas Airport operation. 
Some of these restrictions were intended to mitigate risks focusing on the impact 
that such failures could have on landing distance. The implementation of EFBs in aircraft 
cockpits has allowed pilots to determine landing performance impacts and accurately 
make decisions based on margins and visual presentations displayed on EFBs. 
After performing the landing analysis of the main failures that affect landing 
performance and comparing the respectively achieved margins, the researchers can 
 
 54 
conclude that the impact of the failures for the presented configuration and runway 
condition is minimal and does not justify being in place. 
In figure 4.1, the researchers can observe that the failures have minimal impact on 
safety margins. In the worst-case scenario (SEC FAULT), the margin is 238 meters, 
already included 15% for a factored landing distance. Including RESA, created by the 
virtual reduction of the track, we have 518 meters, equivalent to 1700ft. 
 
 





Wet Runway Limitations 
Wet runway operation implies a reduction of takeoff and landing margins. The 
primary purpose of the restrictions was to, somehow, compensate for the impact of these 
reductions.  
However, the researchers believe the virtual reduction of runway adds an extra 
margin to the operation. And together with company policies and restrictions related to 
the factored landing distance represents more precise risk mitigation. 
Landing with tailwind 
Tailwind operations have their limits set by aircraft manufacturers and in specific 
operations by airline policies. Respecting the manufacturer's limitation, the main focus 
for safe operation should be its safety margins. 
Due to performance, it is preferable to land with a headwind. Therefore, airport 
towers will generally set the landing runway observing the headwind criteria. On the 
other hand, during unstable weather or wind direction transition, it is possible to operate 





Figure 4.2 – Same margins with different wind direction 
Indeed, that tailwind reduces the aircraft landing performance, increasing landing 
distance. However, researchers point out that tailwind makes the same effect on landing 
performance as higher payloads, high temperatures, increasing the landing run. 
In other words, safety margin can be understood as available landing distance in 
exceedance of the required landing distance needed to make the aircraft perform a 
complete stop. In the case shown in figure 4.2, the researchers can compare the “safety 
margins” of two aircraft landing under different conditions: headwind and tailwind 
(lightweight). Observe that there is no difference between margins. Although the margin 
is the same, the tailwind operation (WET) is not allowed by IAC. 
Concluding, limiting tailwind operation on a wet runway does not bring effective 
risk management. Risk management is about making an accurate landing assessment with 







Five knots reduction on the FCOM maximum crosswind landing value  
 
Crosswind landing is a technique widely practiced by pilots in flight simulators. 
The most significant concern of this operation is the possibility of lateral veer off. 
Congonhas main runway is 45 meters wide, which is the standard width of almost all 
runways in Brazil.  
Therefore, the researchers could not find any relationship between the arbitrary 5-
knots reduction in crosswind limitations and risk mitigation, making this reduction 
pointless. 
 
Prohibition of Takeoff with Reduced Thrust (Derated or Flex) 
 
Takeoffs with derated or flex power settings aim to reduce engine maintenance 
and leasing costs (the lower the takeoff power, the higher the efficiency). These power 
settings are used on long runways that allow for better Accelerating and Stop margins 
management. 
According to FCOM, the requirement for maximum power utilization is 
justifiable on contaminated tracks or in the presence of heavy rain but has less impact on 
the dump or wet tracks. 
The researchers believe that the runway reduced power setting prohibition should 
be applied only in cases of a contaminated runway or the presence of heavy rain. In other 





RWY 17R WET 60T FLEX TO RWY 17R WET 60T TOGA 
  
Figure 4.3 – Flex and TOGA setting with the same Takeoff weight 
In Figure 4.3, the researchers can observe that in aircraft with the same take-off 
weight (60T), there is an increase in Accelerating and Stopping Distance (ASD) that 
results in a reduction in the final margin. 
An aircraft taking off with TOGA thrust setting that rejects take-off at Decision 
Speed (V1), when stopping the aircraft completely, will have 197 meters ahead. And the 
aircraft taking off at Flex thrust setting will have 19 meters. 
It is important to note that comparing several other runways or operations with 
high take-off weights (including DRY runway), the industry accepts operation with small 
take-off margins. This is usual for efficiency purposes. It is usual to obtain calculated 
margins of 4, 3, or even 1 meter.  
The EFB is set to maximize efficiency, therefore taking advantage of the entire 
runway length, reducing take-off power as much as possible.  
 
 59 
Once again, the researchers must remember that the virtual reduction of the 
runway (RESA), brought an additional 280 meters margin. Furthermore, all calculations 
made by EFB are following take-off regulations. As long as the EFB takes into account 
all relative environmental factors outputting a precise and conservative result, there is no 
reasonable motivation to modify an already conservative operation.   
Therefore, researchers consider the TOGA setting an unnecessary obligation. 
 
Auxiliary runway operation 
  As the researchers stated in previous chapters, the Congonhas auxiliary runway 
was closed for passenger transportation. 
No reason was given.  
Operationally speaking, the auxiliary runway will naturally not be used for takeoff 
or landing due to its dimensioning (shorter than the main runway).  On the other hand, 
under very low weights, the runway is useful, mainly as an option for Air Traffic Control 
fluidness.  
As long as there is no reasonable motivation for auxiliary runway closure for 
regular transportation aircraft, the researchers believe that the auxiliary runway should be 
available, at least for takeoff operation, as it has a positive impact on air traffic control 
management.  
 
Dispatch limited to 3 tons of EXTRA FUEL 
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 This policy intends to reduce aircraft landing weight. The problem is that Extra 
Fuel depends not only on the amount of fuel load but also on the way the flight dispatcher 
distributed this fuel. Mainly, the planned alternate airport. 
           The same fuel quantity may produce different Extra Fuels depending on the 
planned alternate airport. 
CLOSEST ALT AIRPORT LONGER ALT AIRPORT  
SBCT/SBSP – ALT SBKP SBCT/SBSP – ALT SBGL 
FUEL (Tons) FUEL (Tons) 
DEST 1731 DEST 1731 
RRSV 200 RRSV 200 
ALT - SBKP 1335 ALT - SBGL 1821 
HOLD 1.075 HOLD 1075 
COMP 1.96 COMP 196 
MFR 4537 MFR 5023 
TANKERING 3.486 TANKERING 3000 
BLOCK 8023 BLOCK 8023 
TAXI 228 TAXI 228 
TOF 7795 TOF 7795 
EZFW 54500 EZFW 54500 
TOW 62295 TOW 62295 
LDW 60564 LDW 60564 
Table 4.1 – Extra fuel manipulation with different alternate airports. 
          In table 4.1, the researchers can observe that the same amount of fuel, a close-to-
destination alternate airport will result in a higher Extra Fuel than a distant alternate 
airport. So, in case the Extra Fuel is eventually greater than 3.000kg, the solution is 
selecting a more distant alternate airport in the flight dispatch. Consequently, reducing 
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the Extra Fuel, bring it to a value below 3.000. The result is that the final aircraft weight 
will be the same. 
           The conclusion is that this policy fails to reduce the dispatched aircraft weight and 
makes the pilot work even harder. Once the more fuel loaded, the easier it is the in-flight 




Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Following an analysis of the presented data, the researchers conclude that IAC 
played an essential role in calling attention to the Congonhas airport. The IAC reached 
the goal at the time of the accident, as long as it created immediate additional protection 
to the operation, compatible with the scenario in 2007. At the same time, responding to 
society with quick emergency measures assuring the continuity of operation and giving to 
the public a feeling that everything was under control. 
After 12 years, new technologies and regulations implemented in the aviation 
industry changed the game in terms of takeoff and landing performance assessment and 






Considering the new technologies and regulations, the researchers noted that most 
of the implemented measures do not effectively increase operation safety.  But these 
measures are indeed adding complexity to the Congonhas environment and jeopardizing 
efficiency. 
The researchers identified that the ban of operation of aircraft dispatched with 
MEL items that impact braking distance, wet runways, and tankering doesn’t represent 
relevant safety increases. Once these failures have minimal impact on the aircraft 
performance and they are all pre-accessed through a calculation tool, the EFB.  
On the other hand, the RESA implementation, complying with the ICAO 
recommendation, has effectively increased operating safety margins by providing safety 
operation margin where it matters. Thus, providing additional space for the landing run.   
The researchers agree that Congonhas, due to its characteristics, represent a 
unique airport. Therefore, the regulatory agency, jointly with the airlines, must be 
committed to preventing new accidents from occurring. In other words, the IAC must be 
updated, not eliminated. 
The researchers can observe that the restriction imposed on the operation related 
to MEL items had its origin in the assumption that a possible dispatched MEL items can 
lead to additional pilot mistakes. That is the limit, could cause an accident. 
However, it is evident that the accident which motivated the Congonhas IAC was 
a result of the wrong application of the operational procedures related to the reverse 
thrust failure.  
CENIPA final report stated: “Following the FDR, in the last 28 landing operations 
performed, including the one of the accident, five different procedures for landing with a 
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deactivated reverser were performed. Four of which not prescribed by the manufacturer. 
The last three landings were made with distinct procedures” (CENIPA,2009, pg.63) 
 As previously stated, the aircraft mishandling happened in different airports 
around the world. Limiting the operation solely in Congonhas doesn’t make any 
reasonable sense. Well-trained pilots are prone to perform a safe operation, and it is 
contradictory to prohibit operations with dispatched MEL items or simple failures to 
increase safety. The legislation can never prevent failures from occurring, but it is 
capable of ensuring companies to have well-trained pilots.  
The use of new technologies can give pilots a more accurate perspective of the 
landing and takeoff operation. EFB is a precise tool that enables pilots to quickly and 
accurately analyze the operation, even with dispatched MEL items or failures. As noted, 
the analyzed IAC-restricted items do not significantly impact aircraft performance in 
comparison with normal operation.  
Currently, some companies restrict airport operation to the flight captain, thus 
obliging the most experienced pilot to operate. This is a valid mitigation measure, but the 
researchers believe each company should evaluate it and implement it through airline 
polices. 
 In all tests performed, the researchers found no evidence that takeoff and landings 
with dispatched MEL items make the operation unsafe. What makes the operation safe is 
the realization of a precise performance assessment with an up to date information.  
 Metaphorically speaking, the IAC mitigation can be compared to the prevention 
of house robbery. Instead of increasing the effective measures to avoid the thieves from 
breaking in, you prefer to tear the house down.  
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Information Gained from the Study 
 
 The researchers are professionals currently working in the aviation industry 
(operation), but none of us had actually realized the important changes that were 
gradually implemented in the aircraft performance calculation and new regulation that 
indeed increased safety. 
 At the same time, researchers also noticed with the study results that the actions 
implemented by Congonhas IAC have few practical relations with the original 
motivation, the Congonhas accident. So, the IAC was implemented mainly as an answer 




The study hit the spot in pointing out that the Congonhas IAC limited the 
operation without bringing extra safety margin as the IAC was supposed to.  
On the contrary, depending on the situation, the IAC can make the operation more 
challenging. For instance,  a simple in-flight failure as a BSCU fault (Brake and Steering 
Control Unit). Today the IAC prohibits the operation in Congonhas even though there is 
zero increase in landing distance. So, obeying the IAC, the pilot will have to divert the 
flight to another airport. What if the weather in close airports are not good? The flight 
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would be diverted to an airport, some times with worst weather conditions, impacting the 
operation (flight delay, crew labor hours), instead of landing in the planned destination 
(Congonhas), because a misdirected regulation says so.  
Recommendations 
 Finally, as a recommendation, researchers want to propose the revisit of the 
Congonhas IAC. Fundamentally, the new technologies (EFB) and regulations regarding 
landing performance and safety are taken into account, consequently eliminating the 
prohibition of:  
• Operation with MEL performance-affecting differed items;  
• Tankering limitation (3.000 kg); 
• Wet runway limitations  
 
Limitations of the Study 
 
 Researchers have full access to Airbus documentation, which means that most of 
the common aircraft performance can be considered as covered. The Airbus A320 is an 
aircraft that is similar in size and weight as the Boeing 737-800; therefore, as a general 
role, all conclusions and assumptions of the study apply to the B737s. But, it must be 
stated that the calculations were not run for the Boeing family. 
Another limitation is the absence of cost raise. The IAC limitations increased the 
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